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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 59 February, 1957 Number 2
THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT AS APPLIED TO
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS*
RAY JAY DAVIS*
wWrr the Twentieth Century acceleration of administrative dis-
pensation of justice has come criticism of procedures followed
by administrative agencies.' Many complaints focus upon proce-
dural differences between administrative and judicial adjudication,
considering the latter as the acceptable norm and any deviation
therefrom by administrative officials as erroneous. 2 One such objec-
tion is that administrative tribunals do not adhere to the Anglo-
American doctrine of precedent; that, instead of acting in accord
with generalizations gleaned from their previous adjudications, they
treat each case as a single, unique instance.3 Criticism of this sort
presupposes that the same values served by judicial adherence to
precedent are also present in agency adjudication. 4 The purpose
*The substance of this article is taken from an essay prepared by the
author under a Hughes Graduate Fellowship at the School of Law, Columbia
University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, West Virginia University.
1 For an account of some of these criticisms, see DAvIs, ADmiNiSTBATIVE
LAw §§ 2, 5-8 (1951).
2 DAVIS, Ai LNsnATIVE LAW § 5.
3 DicKNnSON, ADmINisTRATIVE JusTicE AND THE SuPs.EuAcy OF LAW 35-36(1927); POUND, AN INTRODUCTnON TO 'aE PmosoPnY OF LAw 108-09 (1922);
cf. PouND, ADmmNsrATIVE LAW 6-7 (1942).
4 This essay only deals with administrative and judicial shifts in case
decisions from their own prior case determinations. Attempts by agencies to
alter in case decisions positions taken in prior informal assurances, Turner v.
State Compensation Commissioner, 123 W. Va. 678, 17 S.E.2d 617 (1941),
48 W. VA. L.Q. 294 (1942); or by administrative legislation, Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932); Mathieson Alkali Works
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 147 Va. 426, 187 S.E. 608 (1927); Hardman, Adminis-
trative Finality in Claims for Overcharge, '51 W. VA. L.Q. 77 (1948); are
not covered herein. Nor does this essay concern itself with agency power to
reverse itself upon rehearing. Note, 52 W. VA. L. REv. 123 (1950).
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of this essay is to examine that premise, and also to note agency
practice in respect to following precedent and court action upon
review of instances in which quasi-judicial bodies have deviated
from precedents.
I. DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
The doctrine of precedent or stare decisis5 is one of the funda-
mental notions of the common law legal system. Courts follow
indications in prior cases as to how issues in instant cases should
be resolved. Nevertheless stare decisis is the subject of wide dis-
pute.6 Disagreement is focused primarily upon two problems: (1)
how to derive legal norms from past cases, and (2) how to apply
those norms to present cases.
A. WHAT IS A PRECEDENT
There is general agreement that only the "solemn decision upon
a point of law"7 constitutes the authoritative element, the holding
or ratio decidendi, of a case. But there are widely varying views on
how to find what part of a case constitutes the tribunal's "solemn
decision." Methods vary from giving wide scope of authority to a
case to giving it limited breadth. The written opinion is heavily
relied upon when a case is being stretched to its broadest use. As
a matter of fact in some instances any pronouncement in an opinion
concerning the law is treated as a legal norm." This is really a doc-
trine of stare dictis rather than of stare decisis.9 There is even the
. 5 Throughout this paper the terms "doctrine of precedent" and "stare
decisis" will be used as synonyms.
6 In discussing the 1940 Cincinnati Conference on The Status of the
Rule of Judicial Precedent, Professor Liewellyn said that "when it came to
.stating what our system of judicial precedent was, the speakers could find no
agreement, and knew in advance that they would be unable to." Liewellyn,
Impressions of the Conference, 24 U. CiN. L. REv. 348 (1940).
, 7 KENT; Co anrAmms 442 (1826); cf. CHAMBERLAIN, THE DocTmxN
-oFrSTARE DEcIsxs: ITs REASONS AND ITS ExTENT 19 (1885).
; " 8 The press of large case loads upon tribunals forces such unrefined use of
authority in some instances.
Also some cases have become traditionally associated withtheir dicta and
aecited for that alone. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex, (Welsby Hurl-
stone & Cordon,) 341 (1854).
9 This" riticism is advanced in Ohiphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14
A.B.A.J. 7f,'72 (192).
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notion that what is said in the syllabus constitutes the law.10 For-
tunately this view has been repudiated." In other instances judicial
reasoning proceeds without the formulation of any articulate major
premise, but instead applies a precedent case directly to the instant
case.' 2 Another theory of precedent placing reliance on the opinion
considers as a holding that which is labelled by the court as such.' 3
Unfortunately judges do not always oblige by providing neatly
tagged holdings.
Other theories of stare decisis would substantially reduce the role
of the opinion in determining the ratio decidendi. One method
would utilize the material facts, as indicated by the opinion, and
the decision as the basis of determining the holding.'4 Another
would concentrate on the reaction of the judge to the facts in the
case-facts found in the record and from other sources as well
as those mentioned in the opinion.15 These methods narrow the
breadth of the holding as well as reduce the use of the opinion.
Each of the above theories seeks to find the holding of a case.
However, no case standing alone can give a tribunal adequate
guidance. Cases are understood only in respect to their background
in other cases. 16 We must examine a line of cases to find legal
norms.17 Furthermore neither the bench nor the bar is wedded to
10 Click v. Parish, 89 Ohio App. 318, 826, 98 N.E.2d 833, 338, aff'd,
155 Ohio St. 84, 98 N.E.2d 293 (1950); see Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Burdette,
61 W. Va. 636, 637, 57 S.E. 53, 54 (1900). But see Miller v. Huntington &
Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va. 320, 15 S.E.2d 687 (1941).
11 Hardman, "The Law"-In West Virginia, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 28 (1940);
See also Hardman, "The Syllabus Is the Law-Another Word by Fox, J., 48
W. VA. L.Q. 55 (1941); Hardman, "The Syllabus Is the Law"-Another Word,
47 W. VA. L.Q. 209 (1941); Hardman, "The Syllabus Is the Law," 47 W. VA.
L.Q. 141 (1941); see also Comment, 24 BAn 174 (1917).
12 For discussion and criticism of this method, see PATnmEsON, MEN AND
IDEAS OF TnE LAW 100 (1953).
13 MoFLGAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAw 107-09 (1926).
14 Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YAiTz L.J.
161 (1930). This method has been labelled as a "wild goose chase." Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. BEV.
809, 844 n.82 (1935). For discussions of it, see PATrERON, MEN AND IDEAS
oF T=E LAw § 3.32 (1953); Gooderson, Ratio Decidendi and Rules of Law,
30 CAN. B. Rxv. 892 (1952).
15 Oliphant, supra note 9. Goodhart considered this view an oversimpli-
fication. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
161, 169 (1930). For a discussion of it, see PATTIESON, MEN AND IDEAS oF
THE LAw § 3.81 (1953).
16LLvELLYN, THE BRAIBLE BusH 49 (1951); cf. Pound, Survey
of the Conference Problems,. 24 U. CN. L. REv. 324, 329-30 (1940).
17 Cf. Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 24 U. CN. L. REv.
324, 329-80 (1940).
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any particular one of these methods, but instead use differing ap-
proaches in different cases. If a case contains language contrary
to an advocate's position, he will adopt a strict idea of stare decisis
to avoid an unwelcome idea. If in another case a narrow notion of
precedent will not support him, he will use a broad one. Thus each
case has at least two sorts of rationes decidendi-one of minimum
scope and one of maximum scope.' 8
Since this essay primarily deals with reversals of positions taken
by judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals in prior cases, the terms
"holding" and "ratio decidendi" will be used herein to refer to state-
ments in opinions of rules of law which are necessarily relied upon
for the decision of the case.19 Even though such statements might
later be considered as either too wide or too narrow,2 0 they are
usually quite persuasive when used before tribunals as legal norms.2 1
At least they generally show what doctrine the court had in mind.22
If no holding is stated either explicitly or implicitly, one must resort
to one of the stricter notions of precedent.
B. How ARE PREcEDENS APPLED BY THm CouNTS
While Anglo-American courts utilize judicial precedents as their
main source of legal norms, there is no unanimity of practice or
opinion in regard to the way in which holdings should be applied.
The primary difficulty concerns the authoritativeness of precedents.
The problem is particularly acute when a tribunal would, if the
proposition before it were new, come to a conclusion different from
that previously reached in a cited case.
The English doctrine of stare decisis gives binding effect to
precedents. Although British courts make narrow factual distinc-
tions between cases, 23 even the House of Lords feels itself bound
1 8 LLEWELLYN, THE BnAMsNmL BusH 66-69.
19 This is substantially the same approach as Morgan's. MORcAN, AN
I'rRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW 107-09.
2 0 It is for this reason that Goodhart refuses to rely on the court's
statement of its holding. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 165 (1931).21 Llewellyn, What Is the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent, 24 U. Cnu.
L. REv. 209-10 (1940).22 It is essential that the ratio decidendi be some doctrine that the
court had in mind. WAumAUCH, Tim SrUDr oF CASES § 29 (1894). But
see Oliphant, supra note 9.
23 See Montrose, Distinguishing Cases and the Limits of Ratio Deci-
dendi 19 MoDEim L. REv. 525 (1956); Note, "Explaining" Decisions
Based Upon Two Grounds, 72 L.Q. Rsv. 341 (1956).
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by its own decisions.2 4 In the United States inferior tribunals gen-
erally follow cases of courts above them in the judicial hierarchy,
but no tribunal feels itself completely bound by its own precedents.2 5
From the early days of our nationhood American judges have re-
served the power to correct errors previously made by their courts.2 6
The extent to which they feel free to do so depends primarily upon
the type of case before them. The rules of conveyance of land, in-
heritance and succession, and titles, and the rules on the faith of
which contracts and other commercial transactions are entered into
are generally considered binding.27 Courts are loath to reconsider
prior positions in those cases.28 Also in the field of criminal law
the courts do not generally overrule statutory interpretations so as
to make criminal conduct previously held innocuous. 2 9 On the other
hand in some other areas of the law precedents are apt to be con-
sidered as "permissive" rather than "binding,"30 or as "provisional
hypotheses"31 upon which tribunals can build. Constitutional law8 2
24 London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, A.C. 375,
379 (1898). The Court of Appeal is also bound by its own precedents.
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [19441 K.B. 718.
25 The distinction between the rule as applied by inferior courts and
supreme courts is made in Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare
Decisis and a Proposal, 17 A.B.A.J. 180, 181 (1981).
For statements of the American rule of stare decisis, see Small,
Stare Decisis on Two Continents: A Saga of Gain and Loss, 18 Rocnv MT.
L. REv. 97, 128 (1945). For other views concerning the American doc-
trine, see Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15 CosR= L.Q.
178, 186 (1980); Llewellyn, Impressions of the Conference, 24 U. CiN.
L. REv. 843, 850-51 (1940); Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FoaDHAM
L. Riv. 1, 6-8 (1941).
2 6 KENT, Coum=nAnmrEs 442.
27 Ellenbogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which
It Shall Be applied, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 508, 504 (1947); Loughran, Some
Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FoRDiAm L. REv. 1, 4
(1958); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 86 HAny. L. REv. 940,
956-57 (1928); Von Msochzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort,
87 HArv. L. REv. 409, 415-16 (1924).28 In re Proposal to Incorporate Town of Chesapeake, 180 W. Va.
527, 586-87, 45 S.E.2d 118, 118 (1947); Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow
River Lumber Co., 98 W. Va. 698, 708, 127 S.E. 644, 646 (1925).29 See, e.g., People v. Tompkins, 186 N.Y. 413, 416, 79 N.E. 826, 827
(1906).30 Cf. PATrERSoN, MEN Am IDEAS OF =r LAw 808.
3 1 CAnnozo, THE GRowTH OF TaE LAw 70 (1924); see also Dewey,
Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26 (1924).
3 2 DOUGLAS, STARE DEcisis 9 (1949). For a study of the decisional
twists and turns produced by the Supreme Court of the United States, see
POWELL, VAGARIEs AND VAIUTIES IN CONsTrrrrioNA.L INTERPRETATION
(1956). For comments on shifts in constitutional interpretation, see Clark,
Is Law Dispearing?, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1948).
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and torts33 are examples of fields where the doctrine is applied with
less rigor. Liberalization of stare decisis is also worthwhile in cases
involving questions of evidence34 or of procedure.8 5 .
An indication of the relaxation of the doctrine of precedent in
the United States is that while formerly it was considered as a rule36
it now is generally treated as a judicial policy.3 7 Also precedents
themselves are coming to be viewed as standing for principles or
policies rather than for rules.38 Another indication of liberalization
is that courts show less care than previously to "reconcile" their
precedents. This has led to the confusing situation of more than
one line or series of precedents within a jurisdiction concerning the
same legal norm. 9
C. WHY ARE PrEcEDENs APPLIE BY Tm1 CouTrs
Judicial acceptance of the doctrine of precedent comes from
the values of the doctrine as a tool of the legal system. These values
may be grouped under four main headings: (1) impartiality, (2)
stability, (3) efficiency, and (4) political expediency.
33 SEAVEY, CoGrrAnoNs ON TORTS 65-69 (1954); Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 36 HAav. L. B~v. 940, 956-57 (1923); cf. PoUND, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 137.
34Loughran, supra note 27, at 14.
But apparently conflicting West Virginia cases concerning the evidentiary
effect of a view by the jury, which on their face indicate departure from stare
decisis, are harmonized in Hardman, The Evidentiary Effect of a View: Stare
Decisis or Stare Dictis, 53 W. VA. L. REv. 103 (1951). See also Hardman,
The Evidentiary Effect of a View-Another Word, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 69 (1955).
35 Loughran, supra note 27, at 14. See, e.g., Simpkins v. White, 43
W. Va. 125, 27 S.E. 361 (1897); cf. Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172,
179, 41 S.E. 198, 197 (1902).
In the labor law field it is instructive to note the different approaches
of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Parker Paint & Wall Paper
Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S.E. 911 (1921), and in
Blossom Dairy Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 125 W. Va.
165, 23 S.E.2d 645 (1942). For a discussion of these cases, see Mahan,
Government by Injunction, 52 W. VA. L. REv. 217, 226-27 (1950).
36 KENT, CoMMENTARs 442; cited in Clark & Co. v. Figgins, 27 W. Va.
663, 670-71 (1886).
87 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1982) (Brandeis dissenting).
See also Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 163,
191 (1926).
88 PATI'ERSON, MEN AND IDEAS OF =ru LAW 806.
s9 Id. at 305-06. See also the text and the cases collected in the footnotes
in Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 163, 165-66
(1926).
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In any civilized system of government the law should strive to
achieve impartiality. Shifting from a prior position may produce
partiality in result because of reliance on that position by one of
the parties involved. The psychological tendency of man to rely
on what has been settled cannot be protected unless tribunals adhere
to stare decisis.40 Even in cases where there has been no reliance,
justice demands that cases with like antecedents should breed like
consequences, that the law should be uniformly applied.41 The
doctrine of precedent makes possible securing this value. Should
partiality arise through favoritism, caprice,4 or errors of individual
judgment,43 judicial adherence to precedence can correct the situa-
tion. Relying on precedent appellate courts can correct prejudice, ar-
bitrary whims, and incompetency on the part of lower court judges."
Use of precedent can protect one against partiality by courts of last
resort too, since the requirements of opinion writing and use of
precedents in opinions make those aberrations more obvious than
they would otherwise be and hence less likely to occur.45
On the other hand following precedent may achieve an unde-
sirable sort of uniformity. "From the standpoint of justice little can
be said in favor of equality in error. Because the Court has made
an error in the case of A is hardly a sound reason for requiring it
to make the same error in the case of B."46
Impartiality is only a minimum aim of the law.47 It can be
40 However, instances of reliance on and because of legal rules them-
selves may not be too great.
"The feeling is that nine times out of ten, if not oftener, the conduct
of right-minded men would not have been different if the rule em-
bodied in the decision had been announced by statute in advance....
Consequently, in the vast majority of cases the retrospective effect
of judge-made law is felt either to involve no hardship or only such
hardship as inevitable where no rule has been declared."
CAnnozo, THE NATrmE OF THE JuDIcAL PRoCss 143, 146 (1921).
See also discussion in text at notes 51, 52, infra.
4 1 LLEw.LYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH 43.
42 CAmozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDirAL PnocEss 112.
43 Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 CoLum. L. REv. 696, 710 (1913).
But see Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 40,
56 (1934).
44 Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLtJm. L. REv. 096, 709 (1913).45 Goodhart, Precedent In English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 40,
56 (1934).
46Id. at 57.
4 7 PATrERSON, MEN AND IDEAs OF THE LAw 102.
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achieved by means considerably less complicated than seeking out
rationes decidendi and applying them to the case at hand. The
Rabelaisian character Judge Bridlegoose gave litigants before him
absolute judicial impartiality by deciding cases through casting
dice.48 Nevertheless the chance method is satisfactory only when
it can safely be assumed that the claims among which selection is
to be made are equal. Since that assumption cannot be made in
respect to most litigation, the dispute-settlers must have general
directions in order to pass on the claims. The doctrine of stare
decisis provides those directions.
2. Stability
One reason for the doctrine of stare decisis is expressed by the
second part of the very maxim from which it takes its name, stare
decisis et non quieta movere-not to disturb what is settled. The
law cannot permit each judge to act in accordance with his own
private opinions, rather than following precedent. There must be
stability in the law to promote stability in society. Without any
doctrine of stare decisis there would not be the security of acquisi-
tions and security of transaction necessary to our society.49 Cer-
tainty which adherence to precedent helps bring is the most impor-
tant value served by the doctrine of stare decisis.50
Frequently it is more important that the law be settled than that
it be settled right.51 When the law is settled the lawyer has a basis
for giving his client professional advice as to the outcome of a given
course of conduct and the layman has a basis for reasoned reliance.52
Departure from precedent unsettles the law and disappoints the
reasonable expectations of the bar and laity.
Stability in the law is closely tied to the conservative notion of
treading the path of forbearers because of respect for them and
4 8 RABELAIS, GARANTuA Er PANTAruLL, cited in Horack, In the Name
of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119 (1932); and commented upon
in Gest, The Trail of Judge Bridlegoose, 71 U.S.L. REv. 503 (1937).
49 Cf. Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 CoLum. L. REV. 696, 709-10
(1913).
50OGoodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. PEv. 40,
58 (1934).
51 Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1982)
(Brandeis dissenting); Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 16 L.Q.
Rzv. 876, 382 (1900).
52 KE.mr, Cobew.ErNAzms 443.
8
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their abilities.58 Blackstone asserted that "we owe such a deference
to former times as not to suppose that they acted wholly without
consideration."54 Yet to have no better reason for a rule than that
it was laid down in the past by remote ancestors is "revolting, 55
especially when the reason for the rule has vanished. Blind faith
in the past ties living of the present to the dead hand of past gen-
erations.56
The law requires more than mere stability; it must also be flexi-
ble. Cardozo put it this way:
"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." Here is the
great antinomy controlling us at every turn. Rest and motion,
unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law,
like human kind, if life is to continue must find some path
of compromise. Two distinct tendencies, pulling in different
directions, must be harnessed together and made to work in
unison."57
The search for perfect static security is doomed to failure.58
Security can be achieved only through constant change, through
sloughing old norms that have outlived their utility, and through
adapting others to prevailing conditions.
"There is only an illusion of safety in a Maginot Line. Social
forces like armies can sweep around a fixed position and make
it untenable. A position that can be shifted to meet such forces
and at least partly absorb them alone gives hope of security."59
The doctrine of precedent must be applied in such a manner
as to make allowance for correction of errors8 0 and to take account
53 Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting in Smith v. Allwright, 821 U.S. 649,
666 (1944), said that the Court's action in that case indicated an "intolerance
for what those who have composed this court in the past have conscientiously
and deliberately concluded, and involve [d] an assumption that knowledge
and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors."
5 4 BLACKSTONE, Co~niENTAms *70; see also opinion of Coke in Calvin's
Case, 7 Co. Rep. 6b (1609).
85 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAzv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).5 Note, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1934).
57 CARozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LA W 2; see also CAmnozo, ThE PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 8 (1928); CARuozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDicL
PRocEss 28.
68 Holmes, supra note 55, at 466.
59 DOUGLAS, STARE Dzcisis 7; see also Dewey, supra note 31, at 25
60 Lovings v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 47 W. Va. 582, 590, 35 S.E. 962, 965
(1900); Weston v. Ralston, 46 W. Va. 544, 554-55, 33 S.E. 826, 330 (1899);
Simpkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125, 129, 27 S.E. 361, 362 (1897); Wyckoff,
Our Changing Common Law, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 24, 38 (1941).
9
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of changes in conditions.6 ' "If judges have woefully misinterpreted
the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer
those of ours, they ought not to tie in helpless submission, the hands
of their successors." 62 This is especially true of constitutional law
where the legislature cannot mitigate the rigors of stare decisis.6 3
The notion that allowance for flexibility damages the doctrine
of stare decisis is erroneous. Litigation deals with at least two levels
of judicial precedents. The foundation stratum is composed of prin-
ciples and standards which have survived the test of experience and
of reason. It is not in the process of being shifted. The upper level
is an accretion of decisions applying rules.64 Here the constantly
changing process is both natural and proper, if law is to keep current
with the needs of society.65 It is in this area that it is important to
reconcile or unify the principles of change and growth with the
idea of a fixed basis for the legal order.
01 In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1941), the Court took
cognizance of the fact that the attitude concerning the role of government in
providing assistance has changed, and consequently, the California "anti-Okie"
law no longer enjoyed its former firm basis. The statute was declared uncon-
stitutional.
See also Hardman, The Changing Law of Competition-Rehabilitation
After Impeachment by Contradiction, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 290, 291 (1928); Arnold,
The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service-A dissent, 34 W. VA.
L.Q. 183, 187-88 (1928).62 CARjDozo, THE NATUrE OF TnE JUDIciAL PRocEss 152.
03 Correction of constitutional decisions depends upon constitutional
amendment rather than mere legislative relief. Even in states where amendment
procedures are relatively liberal it requires a major effort to alter constitutions.
Loughran, supra note 27, at 13. In the federal area even the most pressing
need cannot accomplish an overthrow of precedent by the amending process
without considerable delay. For example, eighteen years elapsed before adop-
tion and ratification of the sixteenth amendment that recalled the decision of
the Court in the Income Tax Cases. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158
U.S. 601, 617 (1895).
For comments concerning the doctrine of stare decisis in the constitutional
law realm, see DOUGLAS, STAnE DEcisis (1949).
Some recent federal cases in which the Supreme Court overruled con-
stitutional decisions are: Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1988).
Lists of cases overruled paired with cases overruling them may be found
in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944); Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405, 407 (1932).
64 For a more conservative view, see Covington, The American Doctrine
of Stare Decsis, 24 TEx. L. REv. 190, 193 (1946).
For a discussion of the terms "rule," "principle," and "standard," see
PoUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 115-20; Pound
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TuL. L. REv.
475, 482, 483, 485 (1933).
65 Cf. Pound, What Is Law?, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 11 (1940).
10




Proper administration of the judicial machinery makes it neces-
sary to follow precedent. By so doing judges avoid the need con-
stantly to redetermine basic legal norms. This makes possible effi-
cient operation of the judiciary, for "the labor of judges would be
increased to the breaking point if every past decision could be re-
opened in every case....-66 Even if the courts had the man-
power to consider anew every question before them, such activity
would be a tremendous waste of time and energy. Among other
things, it would encourage litigation, for there would always be a
substantial chance that the rule might be changed in favor of a
litigant
The backlog of case holdings is a storehouse of centuries of
judicial experience. Following precedent makes possible effective
use of past learning. The experience of the past will complement
the necessarily limited experience of the judge.67 It will guide him
as to the social standards of justice and the moral concepts of the
community.68
As well as developing dependable legal norms following the
doctrine of precedent has helped shape legal techniques of both
lawyers and judges. It aids the lawyer in preparation of his case.6 9
Rather than being faced with a "wilderness of single instances" 70
he is given a body of material from which he can extract the neces-
sary rationes decidendi.71 Stare decisis also assists the lawyer in
06 CA Dozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149; see also STONE,
THE PRoviNcE Am FUNCTION OF LAW 192 (1950). Perhaps failure to re-
examine principles results as much from inertia as from desire for efficiency.
LLEVELLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH 64-65.
67 This notion is expressed by Coke's statement that no man is wiser
than the law. CoKE ON LrrLEoN 9Th.68 Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 CoLum. L. REv. 696, 711 (1918).
69 Ellenbogen, supra note 27, at 504.
7 0 TENNYSON, Pomms AND PLAYS 681 (Modem Library ed. 1938). The ful
quotation, taken from his poem "Aylmer's Field," is:
"Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless miad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances ....
"1 Perhaps this body of precedent Is becoming too large for efficient use.
Even as early as Kents day there was fear .of too man~y precedents.: KENT,
ComvmNTrABIs 441. Since that time there has been a tremendous expansion
of the size 'and fnumber of reports. Asstimhi'g that decisions continue .to .be
produced at the pace they were turned out during the first half of this century,
the, proportions which they can reach will be astronomical. Moran, The
Avaldiwhe of Case Law, 12 IND. L.J. 420 (1937). -See also Hardman, Stare
11
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presenting cases before tribunals, since use of precedents gives rise
to the argumentative procedure followed in controversies over ques-
tions of law. The lawyer is given a technique whereby he can bolster
his own case by presenting cases in point and can weaken his op-
ponent's case by showing that no cases support it.
Judicial technique is also shaped by utilization of the doctrine
of stare decisis. 72
"In the first place precedents present for the instant case a rapid
if incomplete review of social contexts comparable to the pres-
ent, and of a rule thought suitable for those contexts by other
minds after careful inquiry. In the seccond place precedents
serve to indicate what kind of result will be reached if a par-
ticular premiss or category is chosen for application in the
instant case, and permit comparison with the results if some
other premiss or category is adopted, either drawn from other
cases, or judicially invented."' 3
Moreover by using precedents a judge is enabled to make up his
mind without re-thinking through all the problems. This painful
process is avoided by adopting the thinking done by some other
judge in a prior case. Also the application of precedents gives the
judge something substantial upon which he can justify in his opinion
the decision which he has reached.
4. Political Expediency
The judiciary, which is composed of only a small group of men,
has been given tremendous power. In order to maintain its position
of respect the judiciary must justify to the public its use of power. It
cannot say: "I am the law!" and let it go at that. It must not only
render justice, but it must also give the appearance of rendering
justice.7 4
Although the notion of rigid separation of powers has long since
been discredited by experts in the fields of political science and
law,7 5 it still has an important place in the thinking of the American
Decisis and the Modem Trend, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 163, 180, 182 (1926). But
see Holmes, supra note 55, at 458.
.2 Ellenbogen, supra note 27, at 504.
73 SToNE, op. cit. supra note 66, at 192.
T4 See Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modem Trend, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 163,
188-89 (1926).
75 See, e.g., Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West
Virginia-A Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1938).
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public. The people are convinced that it is the business of courts
to interpret and apply the law rather than to create it. Any depar-
tures from precedent are apt to be considered as judicial lawmaking
and beyond the constitutional pale.76 Thus adherence to precedent
becomes the expedient thing to do, for, generally, it keeps the
courts in the good graces of the people.77
During the time when the American courts expressly followed
the Blackstonian view that courts discover rather than create the law,
there was little problem over how they should treat any break with
the past. The overruled decision was not bad law, but, rather, was not
the law at all. 78 Now that the courts have, at least implicitly, de-
parted from that position,79 the question arises how they should
handle departures from precedent. On the one hand it would seem
good politics to hide judicial legislation through departure from
precedent by failure explicitly to overrule the old view. This is,
however, likely to be a futile thing, for in important cases an in-
formed public will be able to penetrate judicial disguise. Failure
frankly to overrule precedents which are in fact overruled might
hurt judicial prestige and create confusion.80 Consequently modem
judges have openly recognized that they do legislate,8 ' albeit on a
very small scale,82 and have specifically noted cases which they
are overruling.83 This open course of conduct is in accord with
democratic traditions.84
76A discussion of the furor caused by the Segregation Cases, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 488 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), may be found in Fairman,
The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HAIv. L. REv. 83 (1956).
For discussion of an earlier controversial reversal, see Burton, The Legal
Tender Cases A Celebrated Supreme Court Reversal, 42 A.B.A.J. 231 (1956).
7r However, if there is great pressure for change and precedent stands in
the way, following stare decisis will create unpopularity for a court.
7 8 BLACKSTONE, COMMamr ES 069-70. Blackstone is cited as authority
in Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 173, 41 S.E. 193, 194 (1902);
Harbert v. Monongahela River R.R., 50 W. Va. 253, 255, 40 S.E. 377, 878
(1901).
79 The fiction of the declaratory theory was overthrown in Gelpeke v.
Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
80 See, e.g., Union Producing Co. v. FPC, 127 F. Supp. 88 (D.D.C. 1954).
81 See, e.g., CAumozo, THE NATuRE OF r=r JuDicrAL PftocEss 69.
8 2 Southern Pao. Co. v. Jenson, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes).
83 See lists cited.in note 63, supra. See also Weston v. Ralston, 46 W. Va.
544, 554-55, 33 S.E. 826, 880 (1899).
s3 DOUOLAS, STAuE Drszs 80.
13
Davis: The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Decisions
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1957
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
II. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
A. How A.m Pimcsnm~rs A.PPLn= BY AM,~umSmnArvE Acicms
There is a common assumption that administrative agencies
differ from courts in the extent to which they prepare reasoned
opinions and rely on the principle of stare decisis. This assumption
is found in, but by no means limited to, jurisprudential writings. 85
It has received judicial backing.8 6 And administrative agencies
themselves have asserted it.87
In spite of these generalizations, which unfortunately lump the
legislative functions of agencies with their judicial functions, those
who have studied the operations of quasi-judicial bodies testify that
even though agencies might proclaim the inapplicability of stare
decisis, they actually follow precedents as do the courts. For exam-
ple, the 1941 Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
85 See, e.g., the assertion of John Dickinson:
"The substantive difference between the administrative procedure
and the procedure at law is that the administrative tribunals decide
controversies coming before them, not by fixed rules of law, but by
the application of governmental discretion or policy."
DicKmNsoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 35-36.
Also Dean Pound wrote:
"Typically judicial treatment of a controversy is a measuring of it by
a rule in order to reach a universal solution for a class of causes of
which the cause at hand is but an example. Typically administrative
treatment of a situation is a disposition of it as a unique occurrence, an
individualization whereby effect is given to its special rather than to
its general features."
PouND, AN INTRODUCrION TO T=E Pmzosopny OF LAw 108-09.
For other writings of Dean Pound indicating the same general philosophy,
see Poter, CONTEMPORARY Juisnc THEoRY 24 (1940); PouND, ADMINs-
TRATIVE LAW 6-7.
86 See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 665-66 (1926);
State Airlines v. CAB, 174 F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Kentucky Broadcasting
Corp. v. FCC, 174 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Northern Pac. By. v. United
States, 41 F. Supp. 439 (D. Minn. 1941), afd per curlam, 316 U.S. 346
(1942).
The notion that stare decisis is inapplicable to administrative decisions
is go strong that last summer the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit felt
it necessary to explain that "it certainly is not arbitrary for an administrative
agency to be guided by its own prior exercise of expert judgment as reflected in
its recent decisions." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FTC, 236 F.2d
606, 609 (3d Cir. 1956).8 T See, e.g., Musick v. Colorado Springs, 81 P.U.R. (N.s,) 142, 140
(Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1949); American Glue Co. v. Boston & M., R.R.,
191 I.C.C. 37, 89 (1982).
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cedure, which surveyed the subject of "Reliance Upon Precedents
by Administrative Agencies," noted:
"[It is a] striking fact that in almost every instance the agencies'
officers who were interviewed expressed the belief that they
accorded to the precedents of their respective agencies as much
weight as is thought to be given by the highest court of a state
to its own prior decisions." 88
Studies of individual agencies such as the Patent Office,89 the
NLRB,90 the SEC,91 the Tax Court,92 the New York Rent Control
Commission,93 the ICC,94 the National Railroad Adjustment Board,95
and state public service commissions96 have reached substantially
the same conclusion.
Administrative reliance upon stare decisis is clearly proclaimed
by agency preparation, publication, and use of opinions. Although
many agencies do not prepare opinions, 97 most of the more impor-
tant federal administrative bodies98 and some state commissions
88 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Prac., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 468 (1941).
89 Lee, Stare Decisis as to Patentability, 23 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 745 (1941).9 0 Note, 16 N.Y.U. L.Q. Bxv. 618 (1939). But see Note 55 CoLum. L.
REv. 852 (1955).91 Note 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 618 (1939). But cf. Note, 62 HAxv. L.
REv. 478 (1949).92 Roehner, Are Tax Court Judges Bound by One Another's Decisions?,
23 TAXES 310 (1945). But see Marcosson, Stare Deisis in Tax Law, 20 TAXEs
137 (1942).93 Weiss, Administrative Reconsideration: Some Recent Developments in
New York, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1262 (1953).
94 Pittman, The Doctrine of Precedents and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, 5 GEo. WAste. L. REv. 548 (1937).
95 Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Adminis-
trative Agency, 46 YALE LJ. 567 (1937).
96 Pittman, The Doctrine of Precedents and Public Service Commissions,
11 Mo. L. REV. 31 (1946).
OT E.g., Post Office Department.9 8 E.g., CAB, FCC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, and SEC. Also the Agriculture and
Interior Departments, as well as the Comptroller General, the Attorney General,
and the Commissioner of Patents publish opinions.
Not only does the ICC prepare reports, but also its Motor Carrier and
Valuation divisions publish opinions.
. In the tax area there are many pages of published material constantly
emanating from the Internal Revenue Service; so many in fact that even tax
experts are hard put to keep up with the flood Other agencies, recognizing
that bulk does not always enhance utility, have adopted the policy of pub-
lishing only certain selected opinions. The Social Security Board is a good
example of that practice. However, the -FTC has so limited its publication
that -it has been criticized for this -and for failure to utilize legal reasoningin those opinions which it does publish. Davis, Administrative. Findings,
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do.99 The mere act of preparation of an opinion tends to bring into
play the doctrine of stare decisis, for setting forth written reasons
for a result invites reference to past cases similarly decided. The
publication of opinions and the doctrine of precedent interact upon
each other; they each make the other more likely. 10 0 It is difficult
to rely upon precedent unless there is a written record of opinions.
Publication of opinions gives the official a tempting source of norms
which can be used to justify his conduct.
In use of their own prior opinions quasi-judicial bodies show re-
liance upon precedent. They speak of "following" prior decisions,
or refer to them as "controlling," "decisive," or "conclusive."101 They
Reasons, and Stare Decisis, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 218, 245 (1950); see also
Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
186-87 (1941); LAzois, THE AD mNisTrATIvE PRocEss 105 (1988); HNDER-
SON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 834 (1925).
99 The three series of Public Utilities Reports and the supporting P.U.R.
Digest contain systematically reported and digested state public service com-
mission opinions and also reports of some federal bodies.
In West Virginia some agencies report opinions. E.g., Public Service Com-
mission, in the P.U.R. and its own annual report, Court of Claims, in its
biennial reports [this agency's functions are now taken over by the Attorney
General's office, W. VA. CODE c. 14, art. 2, §§ 8-12 (Michie 1955)1, Attorney
General, in his biennial report.
But these state case reports are not widely available and are not generally
read. Cf. Wise and Baer, Some Comments on Rate Making in West Virginia,
57 W. VA. L.P Ev. 33 (1955).
100 Cf. PAmpa, ADmINxsrRATIE LAw 251 (1952). This is illustrated by
the fact that in their reports some agencies, such as the ICC, FCC, and CAB,
include a list of cases cited-including prior decisions of the agency.
101 See, e.g., cases collected in Pittman, The Doctrine of Precedents and
the Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 543, 562-68(1987).
For other agency cases indicating impact of past decisions upon instant
cases, see Delta Air Lines, All-Cargo Flight Amendments, 14 C.A.B. 1148,
1164-65 (1951) (proposal seems within "the Board's policy" as stated in
previous case); Re United Fuel Gas Co., 10 P.U.R.8d 31, 56-57 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1955) (use of prior cases in making present determination);
The Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., 51 W. VA. PuB. SEav. Comm'N ANN. REP. 151,
154 (1954) (reasons set out in previous cases still sound, so they are in-
corporated herein by reference"); Holliday v. State Auditor, 6 Ct. C1.
(W. Va) 111, 113 (1952) ("has been held"); Webb v. State Road Comm'n,
6 Ct. C1. (W. Va.) 62, 65 (1952) (has been "frequently . . . declared").
The view of the Interstate Commerce Commission is set out in American
Glue Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 191 I.C.C. 87, 39 (1982), as follows:
"We are not bound by any rule of stare decsis .... But when, upon-
a given state of facts, we reach a conclusion regarding certain rates
we will adhere to that conclusion in subsequent prbceedings regardlng'
the same or similar rates unless new facts are brought to our- atfen-
tion, conditions ate shown to have undergone a material change, or'
we proce eded on a misconception -or nisapprehensiot. .
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make very careful efforts to "distinguish" cases.102 Even when they
"overrule" 03 a previous holding, they are recognizing the force of
the doctrine of precedent, for an overruling would be unnecessary
if prior decisions were not regarded as precedents.
In spite of the fact that administrative agencies do extract the
rationes decidendi from prior adjudications for use in instant cases,
it can still be argued that they do not adhere to the doctrine of prece-
dents. That contention could be made concerning the authoritative-
ness of precedents in the eyes of administrative officials. It is clear that
they are bound to follow the precedents of courts reviewing their de-
cisions.104 It is also obvious that they are not going to pay any more
attention to precedents developed by other agencies than courts do to
opinions from other jurisdictions, 10 5 unless of course, the other agency
is a predecessor in handling the same sort of problems committed to
the body in question.' 00 The real question concerns the authoritative
quality agencies attach to their own prior quasi-judicial determina-
tions.' 0 7 Here a distinction similar to that drawn in the judicial
realm can be educed. The extent to which bureaucrats feel free
to reconsider courses previously taken by them depends, at least in
102 See, e.g., Matter of American Potash & Chemical Corp., 3 N.L.R.B.
140, 146 (1987).
The officials of the Post Office Department justified their failure to
publish fraud order opinions on the ground that each case is unique-i.e.,
distinguishable. Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 473-74 (1941). Cf. Re Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., 13
P.U.R.8d 251 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956) (rate investigation couched
in terms of fact finding; no cases cited).
103 See, e.g., references in Pittman, The Doctrine of Precedents and Public
Service Commissions, 11 Mo. L. REv. 31, 59 (1946).
104 Huntington Brick and Tile Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. 1929 D
502, 516 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n). Although the commission said that
"stare decisis is applied" by it, it is clear from the rest of its statement that
all it means is that the agency is bound by the principles of law announced
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The reverse, however, is not true. "If it is correct to say that the issue
is for judicial determination, that the Commission holding would have to be
consulted but not accorded the status of stare decisis." Long Island R.R. v.
Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 143 F. Supp. 863, 365 (E.D. N.Y. 1956).
105 The West Virginia Public Service Commission has considered deci-
sions of the Interstate Commerce Commission as persuasive, but not binding,
authority. National Tube Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., P.U.R. 1918 D 68, 81
(W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n).10 6 See e.g., In the Matter of Haddam Distillers Corporation, 1 S.E.C.
37, 39, 40, 46 (1934); In the Matter of American Gyro Company, 1 S.E.C. 83,
84 (1935). In those cases the Securities and Exchange Commission relied
upon cases of the Federal Trade Commission, the body by which the regulatory
statute previously had been administered.
loT See note 4, supra;
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part, upon the type of case presented before them. It is significant
that the Land Office definitely committed itself to the doctrine of
stare decisis.' 08 On the other hand in cases involving moral judg-
ments of conduct one finds little adherence to precedent. Thus the
loyalty program has had a checkered course of shifting standards. 1 9
Also postal fraud order cases have never been considered by the
Post Office Department as creating precedents. 110 Generally, in
handling their own precedents agencies have not rejected the Ameri-
can doctrine of stare decisis, but they have refused to accept
an inflexible rule depriving them of power ever to undo what they
have set down as law in previous cases.111
B. WAY Ar PRECEDm s APPLED BY ADmnmTRAsivE AGENCmS
There is a clash between the theory of adjudication by quasi-
judicial bodies and the actual practice, "for the theory was to substi-
tute discretion for rule, and the practice seems to be to follow rule
rather than discretion."11" The question can be raised whether or
not this deviation from theory is wise. Are the values of impar-
tiality, stability, efficiency, and political expediency as well served
in the area of administrative adjudication as they are in the judicial
arena? Or are they overshadowed by defects in the system of fol-
lowing precedent?
1. Impartiality
The charge of bias has been hurled frequently at administrative
agencies.11 Since they typically work at the "cutting edge" of the law
where their substantive programs deal with strong, well-organized
segments of the public, this is only natural. Use of precedent can
substantially undercut such charges, unless of course the agency
108 McClintock, The Administrative Determination of Public Land Con-
troversies, 9 MimN. L. Exv. 638, 639 (1925). See also Frankfurter, The Task of
Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 619 (1927).
109 Some of this vacillation is due to changes in the executive orders
establishing the loyalty boards, but much is also caused by the failure of the
members of the boards to follow the standards which they themselves adopted
in their own prior decisions.
110 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Seds.,
473-74 (1941).
I I pI ~mn, Ammras'iRnxvE LAw 251.
S112 Konvitz, Administrative Law and Democratic Intstitutions, 3 I. Soc.
PHIt. 19, 144, 150-51 (1938); see also Note, 85 GEo. "L.J. 69 (1946).
113 For a discussion of the law of bias as it 'relates 'to adiqinitrative
agencies, see DAvis, ADnaCinsmTrvE LAW §§ 109-17.
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official has a personal "interest in the litigation in that he stands
to gain or lose by a decision.114 Reliance upon the doctrine of stare
decisis also can secure against errors made through administrative
caprice or the incompetency of an individual official in the agency.
Such aberrations cannot be hidden when the agency's opinion is
available for public scrutiny or is considered upon judicial review.
Agency reconsideration, as well as judicial shifts in position,
can produce partiality in result because of reliance by a party on
prior action of the tribunal. Just as it is necessary for courts some-
times to upset their prior holdings, it is also occasionally necessary
for administrative commissions to alter their previous stands. They,
however, are not obliged to do so through the use of their judicial
powers. Most agencies possess a well-stocked supply of legislative
tools for altering the law which they administer; they can proceed
by promulgation of rules,'1 s giving informal assurances,11 6 render-
ing advisory opinions, or giving a case only prospective effect. 1
Of course there might be instances where only case-by-case changes
can be effective, since it is not always possible to provide for every
contingency through legislation." 8 It has been contended, though,
that they could judicially legislate by case modification of prior
principles, since they can openly legislate." 9 However, possession
1 4 For the various meanings of the term "bias," see DAvis, ADMImNS-
TRATivE LAW § 110.
11 For general information concerning alternative agency techniques,
including exercise of the rule making power, see Note, 62 Harv. L. RBv. 478
(1949).
116 Ibid. See also LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 98, at 84; Note, 35 GEo.
L.J. 69, 77 (1946).
117 In the Matter of Engineers Public Service Co., 8 S.E.C. 366, 377 n.4
(1940); In the Matter of Virginia Public Service Co., 6 S.E.C. 419 (1939).
Administrative agencies have no monopoly on this approach. The Supreme
Court approved such action by the Montana court in the face of argument
that it constituted denial of due process of law. Great Nor. Ry. v. Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Various proposals for general
judicial adoption of prospective declaration of law have been advanced. Han-
ner, A Suggested Modification of Stare Decisis, 28 ILL. L. Rav. 277 (1983);
Kocourek, supra note 25. Arguments against this proposal may be found in
Von Moschzisker, supra note 27.
Nevertheless courts generally give retroactive application to new doc-
trines. Herbert v. Monongahela River R.R., 50 W. Va. 253, 255-57, 40 S.E.
377, 378 (1901). For an exception to this rule, see Falconer v. Simmons, 51
W. Va. 172,41 S.E. 193 (1902).
118 This apparently was the view taken by the SEC in connection with the
Chenery litigation. For a discussion of these cases, see Davis, Administrative
Findings, Reasons, and Stare Decisis, 38 CALir. L. REv. 218, 249-58 (1950).
119 CnamBLAn, DoWLaNG, HAYS, ThE Junicum FuNCrION IN FEDERAL
AMI _nsm-mATv AGENCIES 62 (1942).
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of legislative power cuts stronger in favor of stare decisis than
against it. Since agencies can openly legislate, they do not need
to resort to judicial legislation. In general possession of nonjudicial
means of alteration of policy lays the basis for a strong argument
that there is more reason for agencies acting in their quasi-judicial
capacity to adhere to stare decisis than for the judiciary to follow
precedent.
It should be noted that because of the notion that agencies do
not follow precedent, reliance is probably less likely in the area of
administrative action than it is in the judicial realm. Also, since
agencies generally do not operate in fields where reliance is strong,
such as intervivos and testamentary transfers of realty, 2 0 they are
less likely to incur instances of persons acting on the basis of what
they have previously done. Then too, in the case of new agencies,
reliance is sometimes not as reasonable as it is in cases of courts,
since the admir'strative body is feeling its way and is not possessed
of guides so that it might take some wrong turns which need cor-
recting. 12 1
Nevertbcless there is as much, if not more, reason for adminis-
trati;e adherence tc precedent to make possible securing impartiality
as t iere is caus- . courts to follow their opinions.
2. Stability
Stability, certainly, predictability, and security are all desiderata
operating within the administrative process as well as the judicial.
They can be achieved by courts through the long tenure of judges,
who in the federal judiciary hold lifetime appointments and who in
most state systems are regularly re-elected or reappointed, 12 2 as
well as through the use of precedent. Such is not the case in the
administrative process. There is a rapid turnover of administrative
officials-including agency heads' 23-which means that without use
120 But See MeClintock, supra note 108.
121 GELLHOMN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1225 (1954).
122 But see Von Moschzisker, supra note 27, at 409-10.
123 Although the terms of agency heads are typically for long periods, they
often resign before their time is up. Also upon shift in political administrations
administrative officials of the "wrong" party are likely to be replaced at the
end of their terms (or sooner, if possible) rather than reappointed. For a
leading case on the presidential power of removal, see Humphrey's Executor
(Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1985). For an account of the
effect of the recent shift from the Democratic to a Republican administration
on the NLBB, see Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 852 (1955).
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of precedent there is more likelihood of case made changes in the
law than there is in the judicial process.
Stability is important to the agencies thenmselves as well as to
those dealing with them. Administrative bodies are legislative dele-
gates which have been given certain duties as well as powers to
carry them out. Without some sort of uniform application of policy
they will lose much of their effectiveness. By following precedent
they can tie the future to the past and curb the "opportunity for
interminable shifting"12 4 of positions.
While it is true that stability demands that what was decided
one year as to A should be the basis of a decision the next year in
the case of B, if the facts are similar, still such logical extension of
past principles by agencies is not always proper. "In administrative
law we are dealing preeminently with law in the making; with fluid
tendencies and tentative traditions."12 5 Because of this, agencies
should be better able than the courts to observe the practical opera-
tions of their own prior actions and quicker to perceive practical
needs for change.' 26 We must guard against any undue quest for
certainty, born of the desire to create security, which would harm-
fully curb their discretionary power.
• A foundation of the existence of administrative agencies is
flexibility through discretion. Sometimes the very justification for
creation of an administrative body is that it may exercise discretion
in handling individual problems which are difficult to fit within
inflexible boundaries laid down by precedents.' 2 7 Any attempt to
impose rules of rigid adherence to the notion of stare decisis would
strike at that basis of agency existence.
Because administrative agencies are usually charged by statute
with attempting to accomplish some specified end they ".... cannot
take a wholly passive attitude toward the issues which come before
124 Weiss, supra note 93, at 1266.
12 5 Frankfrter, supra note 108, at 619.
126 Frank, Advance Administrative Decisions (1939) (An address before
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, May 5, 1939) quoted in
GEnHoRN Aim BYsE, AnimmSTAnvI LAW 1226.
127 JAFFE, ADmqiSTRATivE LAw 3-9 (1953). Judge Wyzansld main-
tained in Shawmut Association v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945)
that:
"Flexibility was not the least of the objectives sought by Congress in
selecting administrative rather than judicial determination of the prob-
lems of security regulation. . . . The administrator is expected to
treat experience not as a jailer but as a teacher."
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them." 28 In order to take a dynamic approach they must be free
to act flexibly. They must be "especially wary against the danger
of premature synthesis, of sterile generalization unnourished by the
realities of 'law in action.'- 12 9 Such rigidifying of policies would
hamper them in their necessary tasks of correcting errors and of
making provisions for changes of conditions and of policies.130
Ofttimes a particular administrative case made rule is deter-
mined or directed along a certain course by the hard circumstances
of the particular case where it was first considered.131 Also the
newness of the problems handed to agencies gives them very little
by way of guidance to head them in the right direction. 132 Then too
the complexity of many cases committed to administrators for de-
cision is so great that "we should have to endow them with almost
supernatural powers, if they are not.., at the onset stunned and
confounded by the fantastic proliferation which emerges," when
they attempt to decide them. 133 Thus precedents can become estab-
lished which executive tribunals upon later reflection find were
erroneous. Administrative agencies must have at least the same
amount of power as do the courts to correct their own errors.134
Quasi-judicial bodies also need free-wheeling powers in order
to keep abreast of changes in social and economic conditions. Just
128 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.,
19-20 (1941).
129 Frankfurter, supra note 108, at 619.
Courts also face the same danger. Pound, What Is Law?, 47 W. VA. L.Q.
1,11 (1940).
l30 A desire on the part of the FFC to improve methods of allocation
for rate making was manifested in Re Panhandle East Pipe Line Co.,
3 P.U.R.Sd 396, 411-12 (F.P.C. 1954).
131 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAIIv. L. Btv. 940, 942
(1923).
132 Concerning this proposition Professors Gellhorn and Byse have
written:
"Many an agency sets forth upon an uncharted sea with very little in
the way of legislative guidance. Having started off in one direction,
the agency may later learn that a different course is a preferable one.
Especially where the subject matter under governmental regulation
is not a static one, too tight an application of stare decisis might pro-
duce poor results."
GELLHOBN mN BYsE, Asmanus TivE LAw 1125-26. See also Madden,
Administrative Procedure: National Labor Relations Board, 45 W. VA. L.Q.
93, 99 (1939).
183 Dairymen's League Cooperative Ass'n. v. Brannon, 173 F.2d 57, 65
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 825 (1949).
134 American Glue Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 191 I.C.C. 37, 39 (1932)
(dictum).
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as in the case of the judicial process the administrative process has
little or no justification for retaining a rule merely because it was
laid down in days gone past, if the reason for it has long since disap-
peared'85-unless of course another valid reason can be substituted
for it. Experience should govern the law administered through gov-
ernment boards.. 36
Agencies are to a great extent subject to executive influence.137
When there is a change of executive, the new administration has
traditionally used its power to select subordinates and terminate the
appointment of those who are unacceptable to it in order to bring
agency action into accord with governmental political philosophy.
Even in respect to the so-called independent regulatory commissions,
where in theory the removal power does not exist, there is a great
deal of executive influence.' 38 There is much to be said in favor of
this, since it gives the public, through its choice of the executive,
some voice in agency policy. However, if administrative bodies are
restricted to their prior precedents, such changes in policy will be
thwarted. Thus again it appears that stability must be tempered
with flexibility.
The flexibility necessary for correcting errors, taking care of
changes in conditions, and changing policy must at least to some
degree be provided through deviation from prior case law. The
courts upon judicial review of administrative adjudication cannot
themselves bring about change; their scope of review is limited.' 39
The legislature, while it can intervene, usually does not do so unless
a great head of popular pressure is built up.140 The job is in agency
hands. While, as noted above, most agencies can bring a number of
weapons to bear in changing policy, there are cases where the only
really effective one will be through case-to-case decisions. Ad hoe
procedure is advantageous in that it permits the agency to consider
each problem on its own merits, to recognize subtle factual varia-
tions, and then to develop the law as its experience accumulates. 141
335 Holmes, supra note 55, at 469.
136 See Dewey, supra note 31, at 25.
137 See GELmoim AND BYSE, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 159-69.
138 Id. at 162-62. For an example of the exercise of such influence by
means of appointing partisans to an agency, see Note, 55 CoLrmi. L. BEv.
852 (1955).
13 9 See Part III A, infra.
14 0 Covington, supra note 64, at 199.
141 Note 62 HARv. L. REv. 478,482 (1949).
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3. Efficiency
An important factor in administrative adjudication is the vast
number of cases flooding agencies. 142 Even more than judges, ad-
ministrators would be faced with an impossible task were they asked
to reconsider doctrines well established by themselves. That would
drain their time not only by requiring them to consider additional
issues, but also by creating uncertainties which would probably
increase their case load with cases which, if the law were certain,
would be informally considered.
Deviation from precedent by an appellate court often leaves the
judge of a trial court in a quandry as to what the law really is. 143
Similarly, departure from established doctrines by agency heads
leaves their subordinates without a clear picture as to the content
of legal norms developed by the agency. Since the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, federal trial examiners have
to submit, as a part of their report to the agency, recommended or
tentative decisions. 144 This makes it important for them to know
what the agency-developed law is. Confusion by them, created by
agency shifts, wastes time and effort.
Although even students of administrative law often point up
the differences between administrative and judicial procedure, there
are great similarities. In fact cases resolved by formal adjudication
142 Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 466-74 (1941), gives the case load statistics on federal agencies.
For a comment on the load of the West Virginia Public Service Commis-
sion, see Peairs, The West Virginia Public Service Commission, 46 W. VA.
L.Q. 201, 219 (1940).
143 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 129 (1940) (Roberts dissenting).
See also criticism of conflicting Supreme Court cases by a district court judge
in Union Producing Co. v. FPC. 127 F. Supp. 88, 93 (D.D.C. 1954)
(Holtzoff, D.J.).
Trial court judges are also often uncertain as to the law when an
appellate court delivers only a memorandum decision. See Note, 69 HAnv. L.
REv. 707, 715, 716-17, 720 (1956).
144 A.P.A. § 8, 5 U.S.C. § 7 (1952).
It has recently been suggested that the position of the hearing examiners
be strengthened and that their relationship to the agency in making decisions
be nearly equated with the relationship between trial and appellate courts.
COMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF TE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE CovErN-
MENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SEavicEs Am PRoCEDUREs 372 (1955);
Fuchs, Hearing Commissioners, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1342 (1955). United States
ex. rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1955), adopts the
position that the view of the Task Force is already the law under the Supreme
Court's holding in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLBB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
But see Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir.
1954), ree'd, 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
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are handled before agencies in a pattern similar to that used before
courts. This adoption of judicial technique and methodology is,
in part, related to administrative reliance on precedent. The availa-
bility and use of cases as a source of norms presents a parallel with
the judicial process. It invites the administrative bar to deal with
those cases in a manner similar to the way they would be used in
court proceedings.
Adoption of judicial methodology is of great practical impor-
tance to those practicing before agencies as well as to the agencies
themselves. It provides the lawyer with a familiar method of prepa-
ration for his case. He proceeds as he would for a court action. It
gives him a superb argumentative technique through which he can
illuminate each of his cases with the light of all that has gone before.
In the resolution of cases the doctrine of precedent not only is a
"godsend to men harrassed by the necessity of making up their
minds in close cases,"145 but also of justifying them to the persons
involved, their legal representatives, and to the world at large. They
are provided with authoritative norms and with a technique of
utilizing them.
4. Political Expediency
During the past quarter century critics of the administrative
process have had a field-day. The common use of unfriendly terms,
such as "red-tape ... the mess in Washington," "bumbling bureau-
crats," "the wonderful wizards of Washington," etc., in relation to
agencies, their officials, and practices, indicates that they have to
work at keeping their fences mended. Ofttimes they operate in
politically sensitive fields where misunderstandings can be explosive.
They are in a position where not only do they have to dispense jus-
tice, but also they must convince the general public, those whose
activities they regulate, the courts which review their actions, the
legislature, and the executive that they do so. This is a large order;
but it is one which a successful agency must fill.14 6
This need to justify to others conclusions reached and decisions
made has fostered logical operations throughout society. 147 It is at
least in part satisfied by administrative adherence to the doctrine
of stare decisis.
145 Garrison, supra note 95, at 584.
146 Cf. GELLHON, INDIVmuAI FREEnOm AND GovERNmENTAL REsTRAiNTs
3-48 (1956).
147 Dewey, supra note 81, at 24.
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"Publicity through opinions is an advantage to an agency which
is only too likely to be accused of using star chamber methods
and of favoring certain interests or persons who have political
support. Malcontents there will always be; the disappointed
suitor is rarely satisfied with the fairness of the decision against
him, but the best proof of the fairness of the agency and of the
decision is the published opinion itself."148
That is especially true, if the opinion clearly indicates that the
agency has not departed from its moorings in the past, but instead
has applied norms previously developed.
On the other hand agencies can lose "face" by falling victim to
"administrativitis," the hardening of the administrative arteries. 149
Strict adherence to precedence by courts is something which is
familiar, even though upon certain occasions it might not be desir-
able; strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis by agencies is
not so well known. In those fields where the public expects active
law, agency reliance on past holdings, in place of bending with the
tide of social and economic changes, is apt to bring scorn.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICA-
TION OF DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
An examination of appellate court cases in which administra-
tive action has been reviewed, affords insight into determination of
whether the courts have treated administrative application of the
doctrine of precedent with regard to the values it brings to the
administrative process, or whether they have adopted other measures
of gauging agency departures from precedent.
A. ScoPE OF JuDICAL REvw oF AiMNITRArE DECONS .
Generally, the courts have power to review administrative acts,
including agency adjudication-a power partly based on judge-made
law and partly on statutory provisions.' 50 In exercising this authority
it is incumbent upon the judiciary to walk a narrow path between
usurpation of administrative prerogatives and abnegation of judi-
cial responsibilities. Under the Administrative Procedure Act fed-
148 Ci.mmBELAIm, DowLa, AND HAYs, op. cit. supra note 119, at 61-62.
149 See Senate subcommittee hearings cited in GELLHORN AND BYSE,
ADMInISTaArVE LAvW 38-41.
150 For a general discussion of the scope of judicial review, see PAmcmn,
AininrNxsTrvE LAW 260-70 (1952); see also Davis, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in West Virginia-A Study in Separation of Powers,
44 W. VA. L.Q. 270 (1938).
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eral courts have been given power to "decide all relevant questions
of law" upon judicial review, but that grant is qualified by excepting
from it instances where there has been (1) statutory preclusion of
judicial review or (2) commission by law of action to agency dis-
cretion. 151 Insofar as matters are left to the discretion of adminis-
trative bodies, the courts can only decide whether discretion has
been abused. Judges cannot substitute their own judgment as to
what a decision should have been, even though, if they were deter-
mining it as an initial matter, they would have made a different
determination than did the agency. The building of large bodies
of administrative case law is the result of administrative exercise
of discretionary power.152 Thus federal agencies, and also to a great
extent state administrative bodies, 58 are left free to determine their
own case law doctrines. Their action is subject to judicial overthrow
only when they abuse it, or, as the formula is usually worded, when
their action is arbitrary.
B. EFFEcr oF RELAXATION OF PRCEDENT ON SCOPE op REvIEw
The first question to be determined in relation to the effect of
relaxation of precedent by agencies upon the scope of judicial review
is whether courts will apply the same standards of review to cases
wherein agencies reverse prior policies as they apply in other cases.
This question is sharpened in the area where the agency's action, if
taken as an original matter rather than as an alteration of a prior
policy, would have been within its discretion. A common ground
for judicial deference to agencies is that expert bodies are more
qualified than courts to decide certain questions. 54 It is arguable
that this reason does not apply to an agency reversal. Nevertheless
the courts have indicated that they will not alter their standards of
review merely because the agency has seen fit to exercise its adju-
dicative power in such a way as to reject a past agency case made
doctrine.155
151 A.P.A. § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 9 (1952).
1 5 2 DAVIS, ADmmisTntATIVE LAW 925.
153 Usually judicial interference with actions of state administrative
agencies is more pronounced than it is in the federal area. See, e.g., Parker.
Administrative Law in Arkansas, 4 AnK. L. REv. 107, 120-27 (1950).
154 For an account of administrative expertise, see Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm.
Ad. Proc., S. Doc. No. 8,'77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941).
155 NLRB v. Seven up Bottling Co. of Miami, 844 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1953); But of. State Airlines v. CAB, 174 F.2d 510, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
(.. . . though the courts may tEke those prior determinations into considera-
tion.")
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The question then which comes before the courts upon agency
non-adherence to stare decisis is whether action is "arbitrary" when
the body in a later case does not follow its earlier position. If that
change constitutes an arbitrary or a capricious act, the court is free
to reject it. Otherwise the court is bound. In general legislative
provisions establishing and governing activities of administrative
groups are either silent as to the question of agency power to recon-
sider past actions or else are so ambiguously worded so as to give
little guidance.156 The matter has thus been left to the courts.
Generally the courts have approved an agency's action of an-
nouncing a new norm and applying it to the instant case.157 In the
leading case of FCC v. WOKO, the Supreme Court approved the
refusal by the Federal Communications Commission to renew a
broadcasting license for conduct which had previouly been consid-
ered innocuous. It said:
"[T] he apparently unannounced change of policy.., is a consid-
eration appropriate for the Commission in determining whether
its action in this case is too drastic, but we cannot say that the
Commission is bound by anything that appears before us to deal
with all cases at all times as it has dealt with some that seem
comparable."' 5 8
On the other hand, though, courts occasionally have reversed agency
cases because of abandonment of established legal norms. For
example, in NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a labor board order on the
ground that at the time of the conduct complained of the board
was not asserting jurisdiction over the industry involved.159 Another
court, also dealing with an NLRB case, has said:
"Consistency in administrative rulings is essential, for to adopt
different standards for similar situations is to act arbitrarily.
Under such circumstances, affirmative orders violate adminis-
trative discretion and become punitive, rather than remedial
measures, outside the scope of the Board's power."160
156 Note, 68 Huiv. L. REv. 1251, 1258 (1955); see also Weiss, supra
note 93, at 1266.
157 NLBB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 844, 850-51(1953); Courier Post Pub. Co. v. FFC, 104 F.2d 218, 218 (D.C. Cir 1989);
Chein v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 820 (D.N.J. 1951); Motor Transit Co.
v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 189 Cal. 578, 209 Pac. 586 (1922).
158 329 U.S. 223, 228 (1946). "
159194 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
160 NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1941).
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The judiciary has also at times ordered the agencies to mitigate the
effect of a retroactive application of a new policy.161
In reaching these varying conclusions the courts have not
expressly placed their decisions on any comparison between the
judicial and the administrative processes in regard to the values
found through adherence to precedent. Rather they seem to have
been concerned with (1) the reason why the agency departed from
precedent, (2) the effect of agency departure, and (8) whether
courts were enforcing the prior agency doctrine.
1. Why Agency Departed
Although administrative bodies, like courts, must have power
to change their minds as to their prior case made norms, "if it is the
rule of law which controls, there must be some basis to indicate
that it is reason and judgment that has brought the change."162 The
reasons for administrative quasi-judicial shifts of position which
could be most frequently asserted by them and by persons attacking
their new positions are: (a) correction of error, (b) change of con-
ditions, and (c) shift in political philosophy.
It is noteworthy that in many of the cases wherein the courts
have stated that the administrative tribunal involved was not bound
by stare decisis, they have also noted that the old norm which was
overthrown by the agency was incorrect. 163 Thus they have recog-
nized the power of administrative bodies to depart from their own
precedents in order to correct an erroneous earlier position. Inas-
much as our courts do not feel bound to perpetuate their own errors,
it is not at all surprising that they concede the same freedom of
action to quasi-judicial tribunals.
The argument that conditions have changed under which the
old norm was developed and hence it should no longer be followed,
is quite close to the "error" argument. Refusals to follow a case
because of change of circumstances could be accompanied by a
161 See, e.g., E. Brooke Matlack v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 617
(E.D. Pa. 1954).
162Dixie Carriers v. United States, 143'F. Supp. 844, 854 (S.D. Tex.
1956).
163 See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 09 U.S." 106' (1940); Vir ginian Ry.
*v. United States, 272 U;S: "658 (1926);" Laholinr Plus C6smeties v. Marzall,
196 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 828 (1952).
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showing that its ratio decidendi would be erroneous as applied to
facts today. 164
Courts are unlikely to be tolerant of agency refusal to follow a
norm merely because its political philosophy has changed. But,
while it is quite clear that agencies are sensitive to political pressures
and that they change personnel frequently, it would be quite diffi-
cult to show that the reason for rejection of stare decisis in a case
is the change in agency political philosophy.' 65 Conjectures might
be made and extra-judicial statements of administrative officers
might be pointed to,1 66 but in looking at individual cases, as a court
reviewing administrative decisions must, it is hard to pin down any
agency reversal of policy to a change in its philosophy induced by
political changes.
2. Effects of Agency Departures
There are certain effects of agency departures which have
seemed to judges to be so severe as to warrant them in overturning
the administrative action. Cases where the judiciary has seen such
hardships are generally cases in areas where the values of stare
decisis have been long recognized. For example, the NLRB was
denied the right to impose a penalty on an employer in the form of
a back pay award for a period of time for which prior case law would
not have covered. An award of that sort would be quasi-criminal in
result.' 67 In 1955 the eighth circuit court of appeals denied an
agency the right to reject a contract provision of which its prior case
law approved at the time the contract in question was executed. 168
Thus reliance on a rule of contract law was protected. In another
1 6 4 This is somewhat similar to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus which
is used in the field of international law. See 4 Op. A'rr'y GEN. 119 (1941).
165 Comparison of writings of present and past agency members often
shows a political cleavage. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 182, as compared
with Farmer, The National Labor Relations Board, 56 W. VA. L. REV. 79(1954), and Farmer, The Taft-Hartley Act and the Balance of Power in Labor
Relations, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 141 (1949).
166 See, e.g., Rosenblum v. FTC, 214 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1954)
(Clark dissenting); Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 852 (1955); see also The Dis-
puted Pblicies of the New Labor Board-A Symposium, 48 GEo. L.J. 8M5(1955); Kaczmarek, Change in Labor Relations: Progress or Pendulum, 43
Gzo. L.J. 477 (1955); Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRAcusE L. REv. 93 (1954); Note, 4 UTAH L. Rzv. 880 (1955).
167 NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700.(7th Cir. 1941).
168 NLRB v. International Broth~rhood of.Teimsteis, 225 F.2d 443 (8th
Cir. 1955).
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labor board case the agency was not permitted to assume jurisdic-
tion over a new area through use of its quasi-judicial powers. 169
This too is an instance where the hardship to those caught in the
retroactive reversal of policy is obvious.
3. Court Enforcing Prior Agency Doctrine
In the recent case of Rosenblum v. FTC, 70 a question was
raised whether courts should be as ready to accept an administrative
reversal of an established policy when that policy is being enforced
by the courts as they would otherwise be. The Federal Trade Com-
mission had decided that the use of the word "free" in advertising
under certain circumstances violated the Federal Trade Commission
Act,' 17 and subsequently it had been successful in a court proceeding
against Rosenblum for similar practices. 72 Then it altered its inter-
pretation of the itatute and in another case announced its new
policy.'7i Since under that modification the practices from which
it had had the court exclude Rosenblum were now permissible,
the FTC asked the court to dissolve its enforcement order. Although
the motion vacating the decree was granted per curiam, judge Clark
entered a dissenting opinion.'74 He indicated a fear that expunging
the decree merely because the agency did not like it was dangerous.
If agencies are permitted to turn judicial decrees off and on by shift-
ing whims, Clark felt that the courts would be abdicating their
functions. There is a great deal to commend his position. Agency
departure from stare decisis is one thing when only the adminis-
trative tribunal and the litigants are involved; it is something else
again when the judiciary is necessarily brought into the picture.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it might be said that agencies adhere to precedent
to approximately the same extent, for the same general reasons, and
in the same type of cases as do courts of last resort in this country.
Also courts treat agency departures from precedent in much the
169 NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
170 214 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
171 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 802 U.S. 112 (1987).
172 Rosenblum v. FTC, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming, Joseph
Rosenblum, 47 F.T.C. 712 (1987).
173 Walter I. Black FTC Dkt. No. 5571 (Sept. 11, 1953), abstracted in
2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. § 5095.40.
174 Rosenblum v. FTC, 214 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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same way they would treat judicial departures, even though their
formula for review is different. There is little that should be sur-
prising in this. Precedent has its analogue in individuals in habit
and in society in folkways or mores. 175 The doctrine of stare decisis
came to be recognized and applied by courts of equitable jurisdic-
tion,176 even though at first Chancery operated on the basis of dis-
cretion. A similar development is currently taking place in the field
of arbitration.17 7 Continental legal systems utilize a doctrine of
precedent, 17 8 though in a different form than that of the common
law system.179 Adherence to precedent "is a rule of all law."' 80
Thus it is only natural that administrative agencies should also
follow the admonition of Paul to the Thessalonians: 'Trove all
things; hold fast that which is good."181
175 LLEvELLYN, Tim BRAMBLE BUSH 64.
176 However, equity still retains flexibility to grant or to deny relief as
a matter of judicial discretion. Note, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 154 (1939).
177 Elkouri, The Precedential Force of Labor Arbitration Awards, 3 OxiA.
L. BEv. 954 (1950).
178 Lobingier, Precedent in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 MicH. L.
REv. 954 (1950).179 Pound, The Theory 'of Judicial Decision, 36 HAnv. L. REv. 641, 646
(1923); see also GovERNN= UNrmE LAw 90 (Sutherland ed. 1956)
(France). But see Ireland, Precedent's Place in Latin Law, 40 W. VA. L.Q.
115--(1934)- cii'l'aw jurisdictions).
180 CHAMBEma.N, op. cit. supra note 7, ait 26.
1811 THEssALoNiA~s 5:21.
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